The TPLF reinstates its pre-war council and elects Debretsion Gebremichael as president, testing the limits of Ethiopia’s fragile peace
In what may prove the most consequential political rupture in northern Ethiopia since the end of the Tigray war, the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) has reinstated the regional parliament dissolved under the 2022 Pretoria peace agreement and elected Dr Debretsion Gebremichael as regional president—without recognition from the federal government in Addis Ababa.
On April 27th, 172 members of the former Tigray State Council convened in Mekelle and voted to restore the body that had governed the region following the TPLF’s disputed 2020 election. At the same session, Debretsion, the party’s chairman and wartime leader, was elected president. Kiros Hagos was chosen as speaker and Mihret Berken as deputy speaker.
The move sets up a direct institutional clash between the TPLF and Ethiopia’s federal authorities. The National Electoral Board of Ethiopia (NEBE) has never recognised the 2020 regional election, which Addis Ababa declared illegal after postponing national polls due to the pandemic. The Pretoria agreement, signed in November 2022, formally dissolved that council and established an interim administration under federal oversight. By reinstating it, the TPLF is effectively rejecting the legal framework underpinning the peace deal.
Federal officials have yet to issue a formal response. But figures aligned with the interim administration have warned that the situation risks spiralling into renewed conflict. Lt Gen Tadesse Werede, the federally backed interim president, cautioned shortly before the session that the region stands on “a very narrow path between peace and war”.
A dispute over legitimacy
At the heart of the crisis lies a fundamental disagreement over political authority. The TPLF argues that the 2020 council, elected by millions of Tigrayans, remains the region’s only legitimate governing body. From this perspective, the interim administration imposed under the Pretoria agreement is no longer viable, particularly given what the party describes as failures by the federal government to implement key provisions of the deal.
Among the TPLF’s central grievances are the continued presence of non-federal armed groups in parts of Tigray, notably in the disputed western areas, and delays in restoring full budgetary transfers and services to the region. The party also objects to the federal government’s unilateral extension of the interim administration’s mandate.
Addis Ababa, by contrast, maintains that the 2020 election had no constitutional standing and that the Pretoria agreement remains the sole legal framework governing Tigray’s transition. From this viewpoint, the TPLF’s actions represent a unilateral attempt to override a negotiated settlement that ended one of Africa’s deadliest recent conflicts.
From war to uneasy peace
The current standoff cannot be understood without revisiting the sequence of events that preceded it. In September 2020 the TPLF defied federal authorities by holding its own regional election, winning an overwhelming mandate. Tensions escalated rapidly, culminating in the outbreak of war in November that year after TPLF-aligned forces attacked a federal military base.
The conflict, which drew in Eritrean forces and militias from neighbouring regions, lasted two years and caused mass displacement and civilian casualties on a vast scale. Estimates of the death toll range into the hundreds of thousands. It ended formally with the Pretoria agreement, which required the TPLF to disarm and accept an interim administration pending new elections.
Yet the peace has remained fragile. Implementation of the agreement has been uneven, and political divisions within the TPLF have deepened. By 2024 the party had split into rival factions, with Debretsion’s wing asserting dominance over the organisation while figures aligned with the interim administration lost ground.
By early 2025, Debretsion’s faction had consolidated control in Mekelle. The reinstatement of the pre-war council in April 2026 therefore formalises a shift in power that had already taken place in practice.
Debretsion’s return
Dr Debretsion’s re-emergence as president marks a striking political comeback. Once regarded as a technocrat within Ethiopia’s ruling coalition, he became a central figure in the conflict, directing TPLF resistance during the war and later reasserting control over the party.
His election signals that the TPLF sees itself not as a subordinate actor within a federal transition, but as the rightful authority in Tigray. That position is unlikely to be accepted by Addis Ababa, leaving both sides locked in a confrontation with no obvious legal or political resolution.
What comes next
The federal government now faces a difficult choice. A forceful response could risk reigniting a conflict that neither side can easily afford. Yet inaction may embolden the TPLF and undermine the credibility of the Pretoria agreement, not only in Tigray but across Ethiopia’s federal system.
The timing adds to the stakes. Ethiopia is preparing for national elections in June 2026, and instability in Tigray could cast doubt on their legitimacy. International actors, including the United States and European governments, have already signalled concern and urged renewed dialogue.
For now, both sides appear to be testing the limits of the post-war settlement. The TPLF insists its actions are lawful and democratic; federal authorities view them as a breach of the peace agreement. Between these competing claims lies a narrowing space for compromise.
Whether that space holds—or collapses—will shape not only Tigray’s future, but the stability of Ethiopia as a whole.
